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INTRODUCTION
On August 31, 2018, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) published a proposed rule to replace the 2015
Obama-era Clean Power Plan1 (“CPP”) with the Affordable Clean
Energy Rule2 (the “ACE Rule”). While both rules are designed to
regulate the greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions from fossil fuel-fired
power plants pursuant to EPA’s authority under Section 111(d) of the
Clean Air Act3 (“CAA”), they are dramatically different in scope and
ambition: whereas the CPP proposed to limit GHG emissions by
mandating fundamental shifts in the way the nation generates
electricity, the ACE Rule is limited to measures aimed at improving
*

Mr. Zilberberg is counsel in the Corporate Department at Davis Polk & Wardwell
LLP, practicing in the Environmental Group. He advises clients with respect to
environmental, sustainability and mass tort liability issues in connection with all
aspects of complex corporate and real estate transactions.
This article is based in part on a Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP memorandum by David
Zilberberg, Loyti Cheng, Betty Moy Huber, and Michael Comstock entitled EPA’s
New Greenhouse Gas Emissions Rule for U.S. Power Sector – Legal Considerations
and Business Impacts (available at: https://www.davispolk.com/publications/epa%
E2%80%99s-new-greenhouse-gas-emissions-rule-us-power-sector-%E2%80%93legal-considerations-and) [https://perma.cc/XPK5-R38J].
1. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,697 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
2. Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric
Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing
Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746
(proposed Aug. 31, 2018) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 60).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012).
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the efficiency and prolonging the lifespan of coal-fired power plants.
EPA is currently considering the numerous comments submitted on
the proposed rule during the sixty-day comment period that ended on
October 31, 2018 and reportedly intends to finalize the rule by March
2019.4
This Article provides an overview of the CPP and ACE Rule,
including a discussion of their history and key provisions, as well as a
consideration of the possible future trajectory of federal climate
change regulation of the power sector. Section I discusses the history
of climate change regulation of power plants leading up to the
publication of the CPP. Section II discusses the key provisions of the
CPP and the legal challenges that led to a stay of the CPP. Section III
provides an overview of the ACE Rule and the key legal considerations
it raises. Section IV discusses the key legal issues likely to be
addressed in future lawsuits challenging the ACE Rule. Finally,
Section V discusses the implications of the ACE Rule for the
environment and industry as well as the possible directions of climate
change regulation of the power sector in the future.
I. THE ROAD TO REGULATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION OF
POWER PLANTS
A. The 2006 new source performance standards for power plants
The CPP and the ACE Rule have their roots in the decades-long
efforts by states and environmental groups to compel EPA to regulate
GHG emissions under the CAA that began in the late 1990s. In the
mid-2000s, EPA began developing revised air emissions standards,
known as “new source performance standards,” or NSPS, which are
essentially emissions targets for power plants under Section 111(b) of
the CAA. Section 111(b) of the CAA requires EPA to list categories
of stationary sources that cause or contribute significantly to air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health and to issue NSPS for new or modified sources of emissions in
such categories based on what EPA determines to be the “best system
of emissions reduction,” or BSER. A group of states and organizations
4. Abby Smith, Power Rule Repeal, Replacement Headed for Finish Line Early
2019, BLOOMBERG LAW (October 17, 2018), https://www.bna.com/power-rulerepeal-n73014483402/ [https://perma.cc/EH2B-FSSH].
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supporting climate change regulation urged EPA to include NSPS for
GHGs (such as CO2) in its power plant rules. However, the final rule,
issued in 2006 (the “2006 Power Plant NSPS”), concluded that EPA
did not have the legal authority under the CAA to regulate climate
change.5 The states and organizations sued.6
B. The political and legal tides turn
In the meantime, two important developments occurred. First, in
2007, the United States Supreme Court decided Massachusetts v.
EPA,7 which opened the door to EPA regulation of GHG emissions
under the CAA by ruling that GHGs constitute “air pollutants” under
Section 202(a) of the CAA, which relates to emissions from motor
vehicles. The Supreme Court determined that under the CAA, EPA
was required to regulate GHG emissions from vehicles if EPA
determined that such emissions endanger the public health or welfare.
Second, in 2008, Barack Obama was elected President on a platform
that advocated regulation of climate change. In 2009, following the
dictates of Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA issued a finding that GHGs
in the atmosphere from vehicle emissions are likely to endanger the
public health and welfare (the “Endangerment Finding”), thereby
triggering a requirement to regulate GHG emissions from vehicles.8
Against this backdrop, in 2010, EPA decided to settle the legal
challenge to the 2006 Power Plant NSPS by agreeing to issue NSPS
for GHG emissions from new and modified fossil fuel-fired power
plants under Section 111(b) of the CAA.9 EPA also agreed to
formulate emissions guidelines for GHG emissions from existing fossil
fuel-fired power plants under Section 111(d), a provision of the CAA
which requires EPA to develop BSER for existing sources that are the
subject of NSPS under Section 111(b). This second step put an
5. Standards of Performance for Electric Utility Steam Generating Units,
Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, and Small IndustrialCommercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 71 Fed. Reg. 9,866, 9,869 (Feb.
27, 2006) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
6. See New York v. EPA, No. 06–1322 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 24, 2007).
7. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
8. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
9. Proposed Settlement Agreement, Clean Air Act Citizen Suit, 75 Fed. Reg.
82,392 (Dec. 30, 2010).

2018]

THE AFFORDABLE CLEAN ENERGY RULE

107

exceedingly challenging problem on EPA’s agenda: how to regulate
GHG emissions from the nation’s enormous and varied fleet of fossil
fuel-fired power plants whose very design requires the combustion of
carbon-based fuels?
II. THE CPP
A. Overview of the CPP
In August 2015, EPA issued both the CPP as well as NSPS for new
fossil fuel-fired power plants (the “2015 Power Plant NSPS”).10 At
that point, the Obama Administration, having failed to shepherd
climate change legislation through Congress, considered the CPP to be
a central element of its Climate Action Plan, which pulled together all
of the administration’s climate change initiatives into a single strategy
document. According to EPA, the CPP would reduce CO2 emissions
from the power sector by thirty-two percent by 2030 relative to 2005
emissions.11
The CPP employed a novel approach to using Section 111(d) of the
CAA to regulate GHG emissions from the power sector. Under Section
111(d), EPA is required to determine BSER in establishing emissions
guidelines for existing sources in a regulated category, which the states
are to use as the basis of a plan (subject to EPA approval) that
establishes standards of performance for the emissions. Under the
CPP, EPA determined that BSER for CO2 emissions from the fossil
fuel-fired power sector consisted of three measures, or “building
blocks,” that in combination would reduce emissions to meet the
CPP’s targets. These building blocks included the following:
1. Improving the “heat rate” of coal-fired power plants (i.e.,
lowering the amount of fuel combusted per unit of energy),
10. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New,
Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units,
80 Fed. Reg. 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, and
98). These standards require that new coal-fired power plants include carbon capture
and sequestration (“CCS”), a new, expensive technology that has had limited
commercial implementation, and that new natural gas-fired power plants include
natural gas combined cycle (“NGCC”) technology. See id. at 64513-64515.
11. See FACT SHEET: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, EPA https://archive.
epa.gov/epa/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan.html [https://
perma.cc/J6G7-ANZN] (last visited Dec. 9, 2018).
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2. Shifting electricity generation from coal-fired power plants to
lower emitting existing natural gas combined cycle plants, and
3. Shifting electricity generation from fossil fuel-fired power
plants to new wind, solar and other renewable sources.
Notably, while the first building block entails emissions reduction
measures that an individual power plant could implement (i.e.,
efficiency improvements), the second and third building blocks
envision the shifting of electricity generation from one category of
power plants (i.e., coal-fired plants) to other categories (i.e., natural
gas combined cycle plants and renewables). Those latter measures
effectively call for limiting the operation of an individual power plant
(or shutting it down outright) and running another one instead, which
can only be implemented on an industry-wide basis as a practical
matter. EPA’s decision to designate such “beyond the fence line”
measures as BSER under Section 111(d) would be the basis of one of
the key legal objections to the CPP identified by CPP opponents as
discussed further below.
EPA then established interim and final CO2 emission performance
rates for two categories of power plants by applying these building
blocks to the nation’s fleet of power plants: (i) fossil fuel-fired steam
generating units (generally coal- and oil-fired power plants); and (ii)
natural gas combined cycle, or NGCC, units. The CPP translated these
rates as three alternative standards, each of which were designed to
achieve equivalent emissions reductions: as statewide rate-based
emissions reduction targets (i.e., reductions in pounds of CO2 emitted
per megawatt of electricity generated), state-wide mass-based
emissions reduction targets (i.e., reductions in the aggregate short tons
of CO2 emitted) or emissions performance targets applicable to
individual power plants. States were given the option of choosing any
of these targets.
In accordance with Section 111(d), the CPP required states to
prepare and submit state implementation plans (“SIPs”) to EPA for
approval, describing how they intended to comply with the targets.
States were given flexibility to develop their own strategies to meet the
targets or use the building blocks identified by EPA. In addition, the
CPP permitted states to participate in regional initiatives to meet the
emissions targets, such as state or regional CO2 emissions credit
trading systems. Regulated sources were required to begin meeting
interim targets by 2022 and to meet the final targets by 2030.
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EPA also released a proposed federal implementation plan (“FIP”)
for states that failed to prepare a SIP that complied with the CPP’s
standards. The FIP consisted of emission caps directly applicable to
regulated power plants, along with a trading system that allowed a
power plant with GHG emissions above the cap to purchase credits
from other participants. The FIP was also presented as a model for
states to follow in designing their own SIPs.
The CPP also included a proposed incentive program rewarding
states that develop wind or solar prior to the 2022 initial compliance
date. States would have received emissions allowances based on the
amount of electricity generated by wind or solar projects that meet the
requirements of the program, which in turn were to be used as a credit
against their CO2 emissions.
B. Legal challenges to the CPP
i. The D.C. Circuit petition
The day it was published in the Federal Register, over two dozen
states and many industry groups, energy companies, utilities and
public policy organizations filed petitions challenging the CPP in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
(the “D.C. Circuit”).12 The petitioners were opposed by EPA as well
as a comparably large number of states and other parties. While the
thousands of pages of briefing addressed a myriad array of arguments,
some general and some applicable to specific elements of the rule or
individual parties, highlighted below are several of the central legal
issues addressed in the litigation.

12. Many of the petitions challenging the Clean Power Plan have been
consolidated into one case: West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. docketed
Oct. 23, 2015). Access to the docket is available through Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (PACER), as well as the Climate Change Litigation Database,
established by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law of Columbia University in
collaboration with Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP. West Virginia v. EPA,
CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION DATABASE, http://climatecasechart.com/case/westvirginia-v-epa/ [https://perma.cc/JD8P-GCN6] (last visited Dec. 9, 2018); see also
LINDA TSANG, & ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700 CLEAN
POWER PLAN: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND PENDING LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA V.
EPA 1 n.3 (2017).
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a. Chevron deference
Although agency interpretation of federal statutes is normally
entitled to deference under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,13 petitioners argued that given the broad jurisdiction
being asserted by the EPA, the significance of the economic and
political impact of the CPP and the lack of clear congressional
authorization of such a rule, deference to EPA interpretation is not
called for. The respondents contended that the CPP falls squarely
within EPA’s authority to interpret the CAA and that Chevron is
regularly applied to EPA regulations that are of comparable
significance.
b. “Beyond the fence line” emissions reduction measures under
Section 111 of the CAA
As noted above, under the CPP, EPA determined that BSER for
existing fossil fuel-fired power plants includes “building blocks” that
call for shifting electricity generation from coal to other types of
energy sources, i.e., “beyond the fence line.” Petitioners argued that
the text and statutory context of Section 111(d) limit its scope to
measures that can be implemented at a particular source. The
respondents argued that the term “system” in the phrase “best system
of emissions reductions” is intentionally broad to provide EPA with
the flexibility to develop a range of methods to reduce emissions,
including measures calling for shifting generation from a higher
polluting source to a lower polluting source.
c. The impact of Section 112 of the CAA on the scope of Section 111
of the CAA
Due to an odd legislative glitch, the correct text of Section 111 of
the CAA is subject to uncertainty due to the fact that the House and
Senate versions of the 1990 amendments to the CAA were never
reconciled. Petitioners argued that the House version of Section 111(d)
(which they contend is the correct one) denies EPA the authority to
regulate CO2 emissions from existing power plants because it provides
that source categories regulated under Section 112 of the CAA (which
governs hazardous air pollutants) cannot be regulated under Section
13. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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111(d).14 Because power plants are already subject to regulation under
Section 112, power plants are exempt from regulation under Section
111(d). The respondents argued that the Senate version provides that
pollutants regulated under Section 112 cannot be regulated under
Section 111(d). Given that CO2 emissions have not been the subject
of Section 112 regulation, 111(d) does not preclude the regulation of
CO2 emissions from existing power plants.15
Notwithstanding the thousands of pages of legal briefing, the CPP
will most likely never be addressed by the federal courts nor go into
effect due to a series of remarkable legal and political developments
that followed.
ii. The Supreme Court stays the CPP
Many of the petitioners asked the D.C. Circuit to stay the CPP while
their challenge was pending. In January 2016, a panel of the D.C.
Circuit denied the stay on the basis that the “[p]etitioners have not
satisfied the stringent requirements for a stay pending court review.”16
Petitioners then appealed the decision to the United States Supreme
Court, which in a 5–4 decision reversed the D.C. Circuit and stayed
the CPP until a decision on the merits is reached.17 Some observers
noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had never before overruled a
decision by a lower court to deny staying a final agency rule.18
III. THE 2016 ELECTION AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION’S REVERSAL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION
A. The Trump Administration’s pro-fossil fuel agenda
The election of Donald J. Trump as President in 2016 presaged a
dramatic shift in the federal government’s approach to climate change
regulation. As a candidate, Trump advocated an economic platform
focused on boosting domestic fossil fuel-based industries, including
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(A)(i). The House version of the amendment was
passed as Pub. L. No. 101–549, § 302(a), 104 Stat. 2399, 2574 (1990) and is reflected
in the version published in the United States Code.
15. See Pub. L. No. 101–549, § 108(g), 104 Stat. 2399, 2467 (1990).
16. West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2016).
17. See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (Feb. 9, 2016).
18. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLEAN POWER PLAN, supra note 12, at 18 n.127.
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coal, oil, and natural gas. A central plank in his platform was a pledge
to roll back President Obama’s climate change agenda.
Shortly after his inauguration, in March 2017 President Trump
signed a sweeping executive order aimed at reversing signature
portions of the Obama Administration’s key climate change
initiatives.19 Framed as a series of measures to bolster American
energy independence, economic growth, and job creation, the
executive order pledged to undo nearly two dozen Obama-era
regulations, executive actions, policies, and guidance documents,
among them the CPP as well as the 2015 Power Plant NSPS.20
In light of its plan to repeal the CPP, EPA and the other petitioners
challenging it convinced the D.C. Circuit to hold the litigation in
abeyance as the rulemaking process played out. With the CPP stayed,
and the litigation challenging it indefinitely on hold, there was
effectively no meaningful chance that the CPP would ever go into
effect.
In the wake of the order, EPA faced a number of options on how to
proceed with respect to the CPP as well as other climate change rules
targeted by the order, including the 2015 Power Plant NSPS. Would it
reverse the Endangerment Finding and adopt the position taken by the
Bush administration that EPA has no authority to regulate climate
change and simply repeal the CPP as well as the NSPS? Given the
factual record compiled by the EPA in support of the Endangerment
Finding, reversing it would seem to be an uphill battle. Would it repeal
the CPP only and adopt the position of the petitioners in the CPP
litigation that the House version of Section 111(d) precludes regulation
of CO2 from existing power plants? Courts may question EPA’s
“about face” (as EPA previously interpreted the CAA in precisely the
opposite manner in promulgating the CPP) or simply reject this
reading of the CAA as unreasonable. Or would it replace the CPP with
a more modest version?

19. Exec. Order No. 13783, 3 C.F.R. 312 (2017).
20. Id.
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B. The CPP repeal proposal
EPA foreshadowed its approach in its proposal to repeal the CPP
published in a Federal Register notice in late 2017.21 In the notice,
EPA explained that it now believed that under Section 111 of the CAA,
BSER is limited to measures “that can be applied to or at the source
and not something that the source’s owner or operator can implement
on behalf of the source at another location.”22 Accordingly, “beyond
the fence line” measures such as those set forth in the CPP should not
constitute BSER. EPA made a number of arguments in support of its
position. First, EPA asserted, the key statutory phrases of Section 111,
and in particular the phrase “establishes standards of performance for
any existing source” suggests measures that can be implemented at the
source of emissions.23 Second, EPA asserted that this interpretation of
BSER is supported by Section 111’s legislative history, EPA’s own
prior interpretations of Section 111, and other provisions of the CAA.24
Finally, EPA asserted that its interpretation of BSER avoids involving
EPA in energy policy, which is the primarily the responsibility of
FERC and the states.25
The implication of the repeal proposal was clear: EPA did not intend
to revisit its authority to regulate climate change by reconsidering the
Endangerment Finding or assert that it could not regulate GHG
emissions from existing power plants due to the existence of
regulations of the source category under Section 112. Instead, EPA
planned on regulating existing power plants but limiting BSER to
“within the fence line” measures.

21. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (Oct. 16, 2017) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
22. Id. at 48,039.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 48,040-48,042.
25. Id. at 48,042.
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C. The ACE Rule
1. BSER under the ACE Rule
EPA published the ACE Rule on August 31, 2018.26 As telegraphed
in the CPP repeal proposal, the ACE Rule departs from the CPP by
proposing to achieve GHG emissions reductions by establishing
exclusively “within the fence line” measures for individual power
plants. It does this by establishing BSER based on source-specific heat
rate improvements (“HRIs”) to be implemented at coal–fired power
plants. The ACE Rule identifies a number of “candidate technologies,”
including various smart technologies and improved maintenance
practices.27 EPA believes these are the most effective HRI measures,
meaning they are most likely to reduce the energy used to generate
electricity, and describes the amount of emissions reductions it
believes is achievable for each.
2. Obligations of states
Beyond identifying technologies as BSER and providing
information regarding these technologies, including the emissions
reductions they would achieve, the ACE Rule does not establish actual
concrete reduction targets or guidelines. Unlike the CPP, which set
state-wide GHG emissions targets, responsibility for establishing
targets would be delegated to states. States would be required to submit
plans that establish “standards of performance” for each emissions
source (i.e., power plant subject to the rule) in its jurisdiction
(expressed as pounds of CO2 per MWh rate), which will be evaluated
26. On December 6, 2018, EPA also issued a proposed rule replacing the 2015
Power Plant NSPS applicable to new, modified and reconstructed coal-fired power
plants. Most significantly, the published rule would replace the 2015 Power Plant
NSPS requirement that twenty new coal power plants employ carbon capture and
sequestration. The 2015 Power Plant NSPS applicable to new, modified and
reconstructed natural gas-fired power plants remain unchanged. See Review of
Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 83 Fed. Reg.
65,424 (Dec. 20, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
27. Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric
Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Implementing
Regulations; Revisions to New Source Review Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 44,746,
44,759 (Aug. 31, 2018) (to be codified 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 60).

2018]

THE AFFORDABLE CLEAN ENERGY RULE

115

by EPA.28 However, unlike the CPP, the criteria for evaluation focus
entirely on process: the plans have to demonstrate that the state
considered each of the HRI technologies designated by EPA for each
emissions source in establishing the standards and that the standards
are “quantifiable, verifiable, non-duplicative, permanent, and
enforceable.”29 The criteria do not impose any substantive benchmarks
or targets, and the ACE Rule explicitly notes that states will be granted
considerable flexibility in both establishing and implementing
standards.30 According to EPA, this approach, in contrast with the
approach taken in the CPP, is more in line with Section 111(d)’s text,
which EPA asserts reflects a “spirit of cooperative federalism.”31
3. Scope
The ACE Rule is narrower in scope than the CPP in other important
respects. The ACE Rule would be applicable only to fossil fuel–fired
electric utility steam generating units, which generally consist of coal–
fired power plants, and explicitly carves out, among other emitters,
municipal waste combustor units, commercial or industrial solid waste
incineration units and integrated gasification combined cycle units.32
EPA also notes in the ACE Rule that it does not have sufficient
information to develop a BSER for natural gas–fired simple-cycle
turbines or combined cycle turbines.33 As a result, those turbines are
currently not covered by the ACE Rule, although EPA is soliciting
comments as to whether the proposed scope of the ACE Rule is
appropriate.
4. Changes to the New Source Review program
Unlike the CPP, the ACE Rule also proposes changes to the New
Source Review program (“NSR”), which imposes preconstruction
permitting and pollution control requirements on “major
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 44,808-09.
Id. at 44,809.
Id. at 44,765
Id. The ACE Rule also includes revised implementation regulations for future
rulemaking under Section 111(d) that reflect the rule’s approach to establishing
standards of performance for CO2 emissions from power plants. Id. at 44765.
32. Id. at 44,810.
33. Id. at 44,755.
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modifications” to existing industrial facilities, including power plants.
Under current regulations, NSR is triggered when a facility’s overall
emissions increase above a certain amount. Under the changes
proposed by the ACE Rule, NSR would be triggered when a power
plant subject to the rule increases its hourly emissions rate above a
certain amount.34 This means that increases to overall emissions
would not trigger a potentially expensive NSR review unless they also
involve an increase to the hourly emissions rate. While the purpose of
this change is to lower the likelihood that modifications made by
power plants to comply with the ACE Rule engage NSR review, the
modification to the NSR regulations would apply to all power plants
subject to the NSR regulations, not just coal-fired EGUs, and would
apply to all regulated pollutants, not just GHGs. This proposal, which
has no counterpart in the CPP, is a reflection of the stark difference of
philosophy between the two rules: while the CPP envisioned a gradual
phase out of coal–fired power plants over time, the ACE Rule seeks to
maintain coal–fired power plants while making them more efficient.
5. Timelines
The proposed timelines under the ACE Rule will mean that
regulatory uncertainty with respect to regulation of GHG emissions
from power plants will continue at least for the near future. The ACE
Rule gives states three years from date of publication of the final rule
to submit their standards of performance to EPA.35 EPA then has a
year to evaluate each state’s standards, and if a proposed standard does
not meet EPA’s criteria or if a state fails to submit a standard, EPA has
an additional two-year period to put into place a federal plan.36
Additionally, the ACE Rule does not provide any timing requirements
for the implementation of the states’ standards of performance. The
potential six-year wait for implementation of the ACE Rule, if
finalized, may mean, however, that a future administration and
Congress could enact alternative GHG legislation or regulations or
generally adopt a different approach to emissions and energy policy
from the current administration and Congress.

34. Id. at 44,803.
35. Id. at 44,771.
36. Id.
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6. Key legal considerations
In its issuance of the ACE Rule, EPA seems to be walking a
tightrope between the aggressive and novel use of CAA Section 111(d)
encompassed in the broad-based ambitions of the CPP and not
regulating power plant GHG emissions at all. On the one hand, the
ACE Rule’s focus on “within the fence line” measures would seem to
insulate it from the key legal vulnerabilities of the CPP. In fact, during
oral arguments over challenges to the CPP, the newest member of the
Supreme Court, then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh, expressed skepticism
regarding the consistency of the CPP’s “beyond the fence line”
approach with the text of the CAA.37 Judge Kavanaugh also questioned
whether the CAA gave EPA the authority to enact such an ambitious
and broad rule, a view likely shared by conservative members of the
U.S. Supreme Court. The more modest approach reflected in the ACE
Rule seems calibrated to address these concerns.
At the same time, EPA did not choose to forgo regulating power
plant GHG emissions altogether by either overturning its
Endangerment Finding, which serves as the basis for much of EPA’s
climate change rulemaking activity, or concluding that CAA Section
111(d) does not authorize regulation of GHG emissions from existing
power plants. Although some industry groups and policymakers have
advocated either or both approaches, such approaches would certainly
have been challenged in light of prior U.S. Supreme Court precedent
and EPA rulemaking activity. In addition, abandoning GHG regulation
altogether could have made the power industry more vulnerable to
climate change–based common law lawsuits. In American Electric
Power Co. v. Connecticut,38 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected such a
lawsuit on the basis that EPA’s authority to regulate power sector GHG
emissions displaces the right of parties to bring common law claims,
such as nuisance. EPA’s decision to continue to regulate power sector
GHG emissions would seem to preserve the ability of the power
industry to assert that common law claims should be barred.

37. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43–44, West Virginia v. EPA (2016) (No. 151363).
38. 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
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IV. POTENTIAL LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE ACE RULE
The ACE Rule is likely to be the subject of substantial litigation; in
fact, environmental activist groups and certain states have already
announced an intention to challenge it once finalized. Comments
recently submitted by such groups to EPA provide a clear picture of
the key legal issues likely to arise in lawsuits challenging the ACE
Rule once it is finalized. 39
A. EPA’s designation of HRIs as best system of emissions reduction
under Section 111(d) of the CAA
Opponents of the ACE Rule are sure to assert that it does not meet
EPA’s obligation under Section 111(d) of the CAA to identify the
“best system of emissions reductions” of GHG’s from the power sector
as the BSER “building blocks” designated in the CPP would have
resulted in greater emissions reductions and are therefore superior to
the measures identified in the ACE Rule. Furthermore, merely
identifying various HRI technologies without establishing any
concrete numerical or other targets that states are required to meet, or
any substantive criteria for state plans, is not considered BSER as it
does not constitute a “system of emissions reduction,” and certainly
not one that is “best.”
B. EPA’s modelling of the impact of the ACE Rule
Opponents of the ACE Rule will no doubt question EPA’s modeling
regarding the effectiveness of efficiency measures to meaningfully
reduce emissions. In doing so, opponents will likely point to the
39. See, e.g., Joint Comments of Environmental and Public Health Organizations
on the Best System of Emission Reduction and Other Issues in EPA’s Proposed
Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Doc. No. EPA-HQ-OAR2017-0355 (October 31, 2018); Comments of the Attorneys General of New York,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota (by and through its Minnesota Pollution Control Agency), New Mexico,
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, and the District of Columbia, and the cities of Boulder (CO), Chicago,
Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and South Miami (FL), and Broward County
(FL) on the Environmental Protection Agency’s Proposed Emission Guidelines for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Doc. No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355 (October 31, 2018)
[hereinafter State Attorneys General Comments].
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“rebound effect,” which is the tendency of efficiency measures alone
to backfire in reducing emissions because applying such measures to
a pollution source can result in lower costs, which can lead to more use
of the source, thereby cancelling out some or all of the emissions
reduction that might otherwise be expected. While EPA asserts in the
Federal Register notice accompanying the ACE Rule that it
appropriately accounts for the “rebound effect,”40 as recently as last
year EPA indicated that the efficiency measures included as the first
building block in the CPP “cannot stand on its own” due to the
“rebound effect.41
C. Consistency of the change to the NSR program with the CAA
Another potential target of legal challenges are the changes to the
NSR program, which will allow fossil fuel–fired plants to continue
their operations for longer periods of time. In addition to increases in
carbon dioxide emissions, EPA models predict increases to other
pollutants harmful to human health, including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
dioxide and mercury.42 A number of proposals in the 2000s by EPA to
relax NSR rules were first rejected by courts and ultimately abandoned
and opponents of the ACE Rule are likely to resurrect those challenges
again.43
D. The role of Chevron deference
A key legal issue in any litigation regarding the ACE Rule will be
the degree of deference to grant EPA’s interpretations of the CAA. As
noted above, the doctrine of Chevron deference provides that where
Congress has been silent or ambiguous regarding administrative
agency authority under certain statutes, courts must defer to such
agencies’ interpretation of those statutes. EPA will be expected to
assert that its interpretations of the CAA should be subject to Chevron
deference. However, in recent years, some federal judges have
40. 83 Fed. Reg. at 44,756, n.17.
41. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary

Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035, 48,039, n.5 (Oct.
16, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
42. 83 Fed. Reg. at 44,783–44,785.
43. See id. at 44,776–44,783; see also State Attorneys General Comments, supra
note 39, at 104–126.
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questioned the validity of Chevron and advocated limiting its
application.44 If courts decide that the ACE Rule is not entitled to
Chevron deference as a result of this legal trend, the relevant
provisions of the CAA would be reviewed do novo by courts, which
would increase the likelihood that the EPA’s interpretation of the CAA
that undergird the ACE Rule would be rejected.
V. ENVIRONMENTAL, BUSINESS AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
According to EPA’s own analysis, the ACE Rule will result in the
emission of between forty-four and fifty-five million metric tons more
CO2 from the power sector compared to a scenario where the CPP
remains in place (an approximately three percent increase) and eleven
and twenty-two million metric tons less CO2 compared to a no
regulation scenario (an approximately one percent decrease).45 The
backdrop to these numbers is the dramatic recent trend towards
decarbonization in the power sector, which has been occurring over
the past several years due to improvements in the economics of natural
gas and renewables, impacts of other clean air regulations and
initiatives by institutional investors, which has helped to place the
power sector on track to meet the CPP’s emissions reduction goals.46
In fact all of the scenarios reviewed by EPA in its ACE Rule regulatory
analysis (i.e., a CPP scenario, a range of ACE Rule scenarios and a no
regulation scenario) project that emissions from the power sector by
2030 will meet or exceed the original emissions reduction goals set
44. Justice Brett Kavanaugh has called Chevron as “nothing more than a
judicially orchestrated shift of power from Congress to the Executive Branch.”
Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh, Book Reviews: Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129
HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2150 (2016). In Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, Justice Gorsuch
wrote in a concurring opinion that Chevron “permit[s] executive bureaucracies to
swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power.” 834 F.3d 1142, 1149
(10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
45. 83 Fed. Reg. at 44,783–44,785.
46. While the CPP targeted a 32% reduction of CO2 emissions relative to 2005
levels, the power sector has already reduced CO2 emissions by 28%. See Carbon
dioxide emissions from the U.S. power sector have declined 28% since 2005, U.S.
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (“EIA”) (October 29, 2018),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37392 [https://perma.cc/7BL6D78C]. By contrast, in 2015 the EIA estimated that in the absence of any regulation,
CO2 emissions from the power sector would only decline by 10% by 2030 relative
to 2005 levels. See EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 (2015).
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forth in the CPP.47 However, due mainly to other pollutants associated
with coal-fired power plants, EPA estimates that as compared to the
CPP, the ACE Rule will cause an additional 470 to 1,400 premature
deaths as well as tens of thousands of additional cases of medical
conditions such as asthma.48
The immediate impact of the ACE Rule on the power sector, if
finalized, is likely to be relatively modest. While EPA estimates that
the ACE Rule would reduce the compliance burden on the fossil fuel–
fired power sector by $400 million in comparison to the CPP, it is
important to bear in mind that industry has been operating for several
years on the assumption that the CPP was never likely to become
effective law. In addition, as noted above, power companies have been
shifting their generation portfolios away from coal due to a variety of
factors. It appears unlikely that the ACE Rule alone will significantly
impact this trend in the near term and initial reactions by utilities to the
ACE Rule indicate that it is not impacting their power generation
decisions.49
The long-term outlook on the power sector (and related commodity
pricing), however, is somewhat murkier. The Trump administration
has been a strong advocate for coal and has suggested a variety of
measures to support coal–fired power generation, including loosening
the 2015 Power Plant NSPS with respect to new coal-fired power
plants as well as price supports and mandates to grid operators to
purchase power from identified coal–fired power plants. Should the
Trump administration succeed in putting these measures into place,
such measures combined with the ACE Rule (and particularly its NSR
reform proposal) may slow the trend away from coal, thereby
potentially impacting the prices of fossil fuels. To be sure, any push to
revive coal-fired power generation is likely to be complicated by the
47. See EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED EMISSION
GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING ELECTRIC UTILITY
GENERATING UNITS; REVISIONS TO EMISSION GUIDELINE IMPLEMENTING
REGULATIONS; REVISIONS TO NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM 3-15 (2018)
(showing emissions reductions by 2030 relative to 2005 ranging from 33% in a no
regulation scenario to 36% in a CPP scenario) [hereinafter ACE RULE RIA].
48. Id. at 4-32-35.
49. Darren Sweeney et al., Trump Power Plan Unlikely to Make Case for Coal,
Utilities Say, S&P GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Sept. 11, 2018),
https://platform.mi.spglobal.com/web/client?auth=inherit#news/article?id=4641260
4&cdid=A-46412604-13615 [https://perma.cc/3WFB-ADHZ].
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market forces discussed above as well as regulatory initiatives at the
state level and low-carbon initiatives by institutional investors and
other stakeholders.
However, as noted above, the timelines of the ACE Rule extend well
into the next decade. Accordingly, the fate of the ACE Rule will most
likely depend on which party succeeds at the polls in upcoming
Presidential and Congressional elections.
While a future administration could be tempted to simply send the
EPA to the drawing board once again, opting for a different approach
to climate change regulation after the decade-plus long efforts to
regulate power plant GHG emissions through rulemaking under the
EPA’s existing authority under the CAA, policymakers might be
tempted to revisit another approach: federal climate change legislation.
Federal legislation seems unlikely in the polarized political climate of
today’s Washington. However, a number of trends, including
continued development of a patchwork of climate change regulation at
the state level, increased high-profile adverse weather events, and
growing voluntary adoption of climate initiatives by industry and
investors suggest that some sort of bipartisan legislative consensus on
climate change at the federal level may be possible down the road.
While politically complicated, policymakers may decide that such
efforts may ultimately be a more effective path to the regulation of
GHG emissions from the power sector than an impermanent and
uncertain rulemaking process.

